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Introduction 
A considerable body of research exists on the economic and informational determinants of 
voting behaviour. However, unresolved questions remain about the relationship between 
these two factors. While economic voting is generally understood as a matter of prospective 
evaluation carried out on the basis of retrospective cues available to voters, the extent to 
which prospective information matters for vote choice remains unclear, in particular if it 
conflicts with retrospective experience. How do different sources of information compete for 
affecting vote choice and evaluations of incumbents? Specifically, how do voters evaluate 
incumbents if past economic performance has been good but predictions about the near future 
are bleak? In this chapter, we address this question by analyzing the economic and 
informational determinants of vote choice at three successive Irish elections: the last two 
general elections before the fiscal and economic collapse and the first election following the 
meltdown. Jointly, these elections form a quasi-experimental case study of economic voting 
that enables us to investigate whether the extent to which voters reward the government for 
facilitating an economic boom is affected by warnings about precarious foundations and 
predictions of economic decline. 
 
To analyse this potentially contingent relationship we link media content data in the context 
of the elections with survey data from the Irish National Election Study (INES). The three 
election campaigns are marked by significant variation in the amount (and, for two elections, 
in the tone) of economic coverage across major Irish newspapers. For the 2007 and 2011 
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elections we know which voters read which newspapers, and we can estimate readership for 
the 2002 election. This allows us to investigate the extent to which the exposure to media 
reporting on the economy, both quantitatively (how much do the media report on the 
HFRQRP\"DQGTXDOLWDWLYHO\KRZGRWKHPHGLDSRUWUD\WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VHFRQRPLF
SHUIRUPDQFH"DIIHFWYRWHFKRLFHEH\RQGFLWL]HQV¶HYDOXDWLRQVRIWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VHFRQRPLF
performance. Controlling for standard predictors of vote choice, including economic 
evaluations, our findings suggest that the media have no effect on the decision to vote for an 
incumbent party in the context of the three most recent Irish elections. 
 
In the next section, we develop our theoretical argument in the context of the literature on 
prospective and retrospective economic voting. We then introduce the data before describing 
how we measure the variables. In the fifth section, we present the results of our empirical 
analysis. We conclude by discussing our findings and drawing lessons for the literature on 
economic voting and media effects. 
 
Economic voting: The role of the media 
'XULQJWKH86SUHVLGHQWLDOHOHFWLRQFDPSDLJQ%LOO&OLQWRQ¶VDGYLVHU-DPHV&DUYLOOH
placed a sign over his desk in the Little Rock headquarters displaying a simple four-word 
SKUDVHµ,W¶VWKH HFRQRP\6WXSLG¶6DILUH :KLOHLWVPDQWUDLFXVHDV&OLQWRQ¶V
central campaign theme introduced the phrase into the popular lexicon, the gist of the 
message ± that economic performance is of overarching importance for the popularity and 
electoral success of politicians ± had long been established among practitioners and 
DFDGHPLFVDOLNH6LQFH.H\¶VVWXG\The Responsible Electorate, political scientists 
assume a reward-punishment model of leader and party support and electoral success: when 
economic conditions are good, the electorate will reward incumbents; when indicators of 
economic performance turn less than satisfactory, voters will punish office-holders (Lewis-
Beck and Stegmaier 2007). A wealth of comparative research suggests that the economy 
tends to weigh more heavily than other factors in the vote decision (e.g., Alvarez, Nagler and 
Willette 2000; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000; Duch and Stevenson 2006). This does not 
necessarily imply that voters value the economy more than other political goods. The 
underlying claim is rather that the economy represents an informative and easily interpretable 
clue about the competence of incumbent politicians (Duch and Stevenson 2008). For this 
reason, voters are likely to rely on economic evaluations more than on other signals in 
making a voting decision (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000). 
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Economic voting is conceptualized as voter judgments on trends in general economic 
conditions serving to predict vote choice for or against incumbent candidates. Past findings 
were inconclusive as to whether voters take their clues from the wider economy and behave, 
in the terminology of the ILHOGµVRFLRWURSLFDOO\¶, or follow a pattern of pocket-book voting 
µegotropic¶YRWLQJDVZDVRULJLQDOO\UHSRUWHGE\.LHZLHWDQG.LQGHUHowever, the 
current state of knowledge tends toward voters considering national economic conditions 
when casting their vote (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2007). 
 
Another major controversy in economic voting research concerned the question of whether 
voters are retrospective or prospective in evaluating economic performance. While rational 
voters should be prospective in their assessment of election candidates and how they would 
perform in office once elected (Downs 1957), most empirical findings indicate that measures 
of retrospective economic evaluation by citizens work better than indicators of prospective 
evaluation (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2007). Given the considerable difficulties citizens 
face in predicting future trends, most scholars now assume that voters derive clues from 
observing the past performance of incumbents (Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000).  
 
To date, this assumption has gone largely untested. One reason for this is that prospective 
expectations and retrospective assessments frequently point in the same direction. Indeed, as 
Lewis-Beck and Paldam (2000, 118) remarked, µ[t]here is very little difference between 
retrospective and prospective expectations, as people have largely static expectations¶ 
Economic voting, in the words of Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, µmay be retrospective, 
prospective, or a mix of the two, depending in part on the political context. When the 
incumbent party has a clear political track record, retrospective evaluations should 
outperform prospective judgments¶ (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2007, 531.). Thus, voters 
seem to view past and current economic trends as strongly indicative of the future. However, 
this makes them prone to misjudge future developments. In this, voters are not alone: 
economists, for their part, have a µrecord of failure to predict recessions¶ that remains 
µvirtually unblemished¶ (Loungani 2001, 419). Voter perceptions of the economy are shaped 
by these expert judgements about how well the economy performs, and these expert 
judgements are channelled to voters through the news media. This opens up the possibility 
that retrospective and prospective evaluations are in conflict. The question is then: What do 
voters do if past performance and outlook diverge?  
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We do not expect voters to be better forecasters than economists. However, we propose that 
the way in which mass expectations about future economic performance are formed is an 
important factor in determining the extent to which, as well as how, economic circumstances 
affect perception and, ultimately, vote choice. Thus, we take into account the information 
environment in which voters arrive at their retrospective and/or prospective evaluations and 
allow this to inform their vote choices. Existing evidence is inconclusive as to whether 
economic voting is seen as rational and informed or rather as a matter of taking accessible 
cues and satisficing (see, for example, MacKuen, Ericson and Stimson 1992). In fact, the role 
of the media in informing voters and providing a basis for economic voting remains severely 
under-researched. Only rarely has media coverage been taken into account as a variable in 
models of economic voting. Where the media did enter the analysis, the focus has mostly 
been on media exposure as an indicator of political sophistication (Gomez and Wilson 2001; 
Hetherington 1996). A recent exception is the analysis of the economy-media-public opinion 
nexus by Soroka et al. (2014). These scholars compare trends in macro-economic indicators, 
tone and amount of economic coverage with public evaluations about the economy in the US 
between 1980 and 2010. They find that media coverage tends to focus on current and future 
economic indicators, such as growth forecasts. Media reporting reflects changes in indicators 
rather than absolute measures of, for example, growth. Moreover, there seems to be a 
mutually reinforcing relationship between media measures and public opinion: the media 
reflect opinion changes while also effectively relaying information about changes in core 
indicators, thus rendering public mood similarly sensitive to changes in macroeconomic 
trends. 
 
While the analysis by Soroka et al. (2014) benefits from their use of longitudinal data 
covering over 30 years, it is confined to the aggregate level, thereby black-boxing the causal 
process underlying opinion formation and vote choice. We aim to shed light into the box by 
using INES data to examine the role of media input on economic voting at the individual 
level. Finally, while Soroka et al. analyse how the economy developed according to real-
world indicators, how this was reported in the media and how it was perceived by the public 
at large, we investigate how media reporting, individual perceptions, and their interplay shape 
vote choice. 
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Beyond the aforementioned research, studies on economic voting have only taken a limited 
interest in media variables and only insofar as they could be understood as µa strong correlate 
of political sophistication and awareness¶ (Gomez and Wilson 2001, 900). Frequent media 
users have proven to be less focused on personal circumstances and hence to be less prone to 
pocketbook voting. It has been suggested that this is not only because more exposure reflects 
higher levels of awareness and sophistication but also because a µVRFLRWURSLFSULPLQJHIIHFW´
occurs (Mutz 1992, 499). This implies that economic news emphasizes collective experiences 
with the economy, so that high media exposure leads voters to take such a larger picture more 
into account and to be less pre-occupied with their personal situation when evaluating 
governments and making their vote choice. 
 
One shortcoming within the field of economic voting research is that the interest in media 
effects has remained relatively marginal. The literature has focussed exclusively on 
distinguishing between levels of awareness and sophistication. Moreover, the 
operationalization of such media effects remains restricted to simple measures of exposure 
(Holbrook and Garand 1996, Anderson et al. 2004, Ansolabehere et al. (2011). As a result, 
the type of media outlets respondents are exposed to have not been taken into account, and 
neither has the content within those media been included in the analysis. In fact, any 
consideration of media content is limited to aggregate level studies that investigate the 
dynamics of real-word indicators, overall tendencies in media coverage and public opinion 
trends, such as aggregate economic perceptions (Soroka et al. 2014), consumer confidence 
(Hollanders and Vliegenthart 2011) or government popularity functions (Sanders et al. 1993). 
What is lacking, firstly, is a clear assessment of how voters obtain the information they need 
to base their vote choice on economic evaluations. Secondly, we do not know whether 
individual-level variation in the attention that is paid to economic issues is driven by media 
coverage. 
 
The literature on media effects points us in a useful direction, in particular in the form of the 
theory of priming (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Krosnick and Kinder 1990). Priming is an 
extension to agenda setting. This extension is crucial for any attempt at assessing the role of 
the media in economic voting. The agenda setting perspective implies that public attention to 
specific policy issues is directed and driven by media emphases: the more the media report on 
an issue or a policy area, the more the public becomes aware of it and cares about it 
(McCombs and Shaw 1972, 1993). Priming theory goes a step further and proposes that, 
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when our attention is directed towards an issue, a problem or a policy area, our wider political 
decisions ± such as over how we evaluate governments, presidents or prime ministers, or who 
to vote for ± are primed so as to be dominated by consideration of said issue, problem or 
policy area (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Krosnick and Kinder 1990). With regard to economic 
voting, priming is therefore a valuable concept that allows us to propose an explanation of 
variation between individuals in how salient economic considerations become when a vote 
choice is to be made. In addition, we expect a simple information advantage of respondents 
thus primed: the more the focus on economic issues in the medium of choice, the higher the 
exposure to relevant information, and hence, the more solid the basis on which economic 
evaluations are formed and able to GULYHDUHVSRQGHQW¶VYRWHFKRLFH This leads to our first 
hypothesis: 
 
H1: The more economic content readers are exposed to, the greater the association between 
economic evaluations and vote choice. 
 
Beyond variation in the importance of the economy for an LQGLYLGXDO¶VYRWHFKRLFH, we are 
interested in how voters decide in situations of varying complexity about how good a 
guidance previous experience is for future economic expectations. We are not aware of any 
available coding of media content that readily distinguishes between retrospective and 
prospective economic coverage: it would mean to introduce yet more complexity into coding 
schemes to take into account the relative treatment of government records versus pledges and 
promises for the future. However, in a situation of increasing complexity, we would expect 
voters to be reliant on information and judgments from trusted sources to guide their 
evaluations of governments¶HFRQRPLFSHUIRUPDQFH. Indeed, the mass media do not merely 
provide readers with information and agendas, but they also implicitly or explicitly deliver 
judgments and recommendations with their reporting. Previous studies of media persuasion 
were concerned mainly with the detection of a general partisan bias (see e.g. Druckman and 
Parkin 2005, Ladd and Lenz 2009, Brandenburg and van Egmond 2013). By contrast, we 
propose that positive and negative media judgments about the state of the economy, or indeed 
its future prospects, serve as a tool for voters to make up their mind in an election campaign. 
Thus, we expect that 
 
H2: The more negative reporting on the economy readers are exposed to, the more likely they 
are to vote against the incumbent. 
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Data: Irish national elections and the economic collapse 
By using the three waves of the INES we can analyse elections that took place under 
substantially different economic circumstances and that were accompanied by vastly different 
media reporting. To this end, we analyse vote choice and its determinants in the context of 
three Irish general elections of 2002, 2007 and 2011. The 2002 election took place in the 
midst of an unprecedented economic boom that was to continue for another six years. In 2007 
the boom was reaching its end with abounding warning signs of an over-heating housing 
market. The subsequent 2011 election occurred after the economic collapse and after a 
bailout by the European Union and the International Monetary Fund placed severe austerity 
rules on the Irish economy and on the electorate. At first glance, Ireland seems to provide a 
typical example of economic voting over these past three elections (for an analysis of the 
extent of economic voting in Ireland, see the chapter by Leyden and Lewis-Beck in this 
volume). The government, and most of all the senior coalition partner, Fianna Fáil, was 
rewarded twice for overseeing an economic boom, receiving 41.5 per cent of first-preference 
votes in 2002 and 41.6 per cent 2007. The junior coalition partner, the Progressive 
Democrats, gained two seats (in spite of a drop in first-preference votes) in 2002 and lost 
both seats and votes in 2007. Fianna Fáil was severely punished in 2011 in the wake of the 
economic and fiscal collapse, having its share of first-preference votes reduced to 17.5 per 
cent. Its coalition partner from 2007 until the breakdown of the 28th Government of Ireland, 
the Green Party, received less than two per cent of the first-preference votes and lost all of its 
six seats in the DáLO)LDQQD)iLO¶VHUVWZKLOH junior coalition partner, the Progressive 
Democrats, had disbanded by November 2009, following devastating election results and 
political obsolescence from 2007 onward). 
 
The evidence from the Irish case supports the claim that the electoral response to economic 
conditions is asymmetrical, with governments being punished considerably more for 
overseeing bad times than they are rewarded for good times (van der Brug et al. 2007,163ff.; 
Soroka 2006). Existing research into economic voting in Ireland suggests that economic 
voting was less in evidence during the good times, when voters seemed more concerned 
about quality of life issues, than it became in the post-collapse election of 2011 (Chapter X; 
Marsh and Tilley 2010, Marsh and Mikhaylov 2012).  
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Another advantage of studying the Irish case is the fact that Irish newspapers are not 
traditionally partisan. This means that their readers are less drawn to particular papers 
because of their political leanings. At the same time, they vary with respect to their 
judgments on government policy and performance. As a result, the endogeneity problem that 
is evident in for instance the British case (see Ladd and Lenz 2009, 395ff; Brandenburg and 
van Egmond 2011, 450f) does not arise. Lastly, economic voting requires sufficient clarity of 
government responsibility matters. In the case of coalition government, the economic vote 
coefficient may weaken, because voters are less clear about who to blame compared with 
single-party government (Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000; Powell and Whitten 1993; Royed et 
al. 2001). With coalition government being the norm in Irish politics, the three election 
studies provide us with least likely cases for an effect of economic evaluations on voter 
support for the main government party. At the same time, they open up the possibility that the 
media may assist voters in identifying the government party responsible for good or bad 
economic times. 
 
Measurement if vote choice, media reporting and control variables 
Retrospective economic voting is about providing support for or withholding support from 
the incumbent parties, and the latter can be done with or without transferring support 
explicitly to another party. Thus, abstention is an element in the set of the economic vote 
choice ± in particular in times of crisis. According to Kriesi (2012), disaffected voters have 
several options, including turning to opposition parties and abstaining from voting. This 
could be observed in, e.g., Southern European countries that were severely affected by the 
crisis. For the case of Portugal, Freire and Santana-Pereira (2012) have found that the 
incumbent presiding over an economic crisis is punished by a combination of µsincere protest 
voting¶DQGabstention. And for the Italian case, Passarelli and Tuorto have concluded that 
abstention functioned as a relief valve for the discontented electorate, so that voters¶critical 
evaluations of the economy led to µeconomic non-votLQJ¶Passarelli and Tuorto 2014, 156). 
Therefore, the dependent variable in our analysis is the vote for the main government party. 
This variable takes on the value 1 if a respondent indicated that they voted for Fianna Fáil at 
the respective national election. It is coded zero for respondents who indicated that they voted 
either for an opposition party or abstained from voting. 
 
The main independent variables of interest are UHVSRQGHQWV¶ evaluations RIWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶V
handling of the economy, as well as media coverage of, and media judgments on, this topic. 
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For their individual evaluationsUHVSRQGHQWVZHUHDVNHGµThinking back over the last five 
years ± the lifetime of the 1997 to 2002 Fianna Fáil/Progressive Democrat government ± 
would you say that the ECONOMY in Ireland over that period of time got a lot better; a little 
better; stayed the same; got a little worse; or got a lot worse?¶1  
 
For each of the three elections, we can link INES survey data with content analysis data from 
major Irish daily newspapers in order to ascertain whether economic voting is predicated on 
the extent and nature of economic coverage that respondents are exposed to. The newspapers 
analysed are the Evening Herald, the Irish Examiner, the Irish Independent, The Irish Times, 
The Irish Sun, and the Irish Daily Star.2 The different newspapers vary in amount and 
tendency of economic coverage, and separate media content analyses are available for each of 
these three elections.3 During each of the three election, content analysis covered the entire 
official campaign period, from the day after dissolution of the Dáil to the day before election 
was held. The 2007 and the 2011 INES contain newspaper readership variables that allow us 
to directly match news content with individual respondents in the sample. News readership 
has not been recorded for in the 2002 election study. However, the 2007 INES contains a 
panel element, which includes 545 respondents who took part both in the 2002 and the 2007 
waves. Therefore, we can use the 2007 readership data as a proxy for 2002 media behaviour 
for these respondents. While this may be imprecise, there is little to suggest that newspaper 
readership changes radically across even a five-year period.4 
                                                          
1
 ,QWKHTXHVWLRQQDLUHWKHWLPHFKDQJHVIURPµODVWILYH\HDUV¶WRµODVWIRXU\HDUV¶ 
2
 Selection of newspapers was based on readership figures. 2002 was a smaller study that only included the four 
largest selling papers, while 2007 included the six largest, all with an estimated readership of over 250,000 
(http://www.finfacts.ie/finfactsblog/2007/03/irish-newspaper-readership-2007.html). In 2011, the Evening 
Herald was dropped from selection, perhaps because despite the existence of national edition it is widely 
perceived as a local, Dublin-based paper. 
3
 For details of the coding procedure, coding categories, and inter-coder reliability tests see Brandenburg (2005) 
DQG2¶0DOOH\HWDO 
4
 Since readership is in decline and we are using a proxy that is moving backwards in time, errors are more 
likely to occur due to readers having switched papers than not having been a reader in 2002. We are not aware 
of any systematic studies into stability and switching in newspaper readership, either in the form of national case 
studies or comparative research. The only evidence available comes from the UK, where Ladd and Lenz (2009) 
report a majority of readers in tKHLUVDPSOHDVµKDELWXDO¶UHDGHUV7KHDXWKRUVRQO\FRXQWHGUHVSRQGHQWVDV
habitual readers if they reported reading the same newspaper in every one of five waves of the 1992-1997 
British Election Panel Survey. 
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Our media content variables are coverage and tone. Coverage is the proportion of total 
coverage in a newspaper devoted to economic issues over the course of the campaign. We 
treat this as an indicator of how much emphasis a particular newspaper placed on economic 
issues in the run-up to each of these three elections. Table 1 provides an overview of the 
coverage of economic issues in six Irish newspapers. There is quite some variation in the 
space that economic matters take up within each newspaper. In 2002, a little over 10 per cent 
of news content in the Evening Herald was on economic issues, while this amounts to over 
16 per cent in the Irish Independent. An arguably more interesting comparison is over time. 
The average share of economic news reporting in all newspapers in 2002 was 13.5 per cent. 
This almost halved by 2007 (7.2 per cent) and eventually rose to one quarter of all news 
coverage in 2011. For three newspapers, the Irish Examiner, the Irish Times and the Irish 
Independent, we have coverage data for all three-election years. Each of these paper 
individually reproduces the aforementioned pattern: as Ireland was on the verge the financial 
meltdown, economic news reporting was at its lowest.  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
In addition to coverage of the economy, we include an interaction term between economic 
overage and a respondent¶VHYDOXDWLRQRIWKHHFRQRP\ in our empirical model. This enables 
us to estimate how variation in coverage across newspapers affects how likely their readers 
are to vote according to economic evaluations. While it is often advisable to compute 
multiplicatory terms based on the full range of the component continuous variables to 
maximize the information contained in the interaction term (MacCallum et al. 2002), in the 
present case this would not result in an interaction term suitable for testing H1. Recall that the 
hypothesis states that those exposed to more economic coverage are more likely to display 
economic voting behaviour. If we simply interacted the continuous media variable with the 
ordinal evaluation scale, high values on the new variable would indicate exposure to much 
economic coverage paired with positive economic evaluation and low values exposure to 
little economic coverage and negative economic evaluations. However, our hypothesis is 
two-tailed: we would expect those exposed to larger quantities of economic coverage and 
making positive evaluations to be more likely to vote for the government than those with 
either less exposure or less positive evaluations or both. We also expect respondents exposed 
to a lot of economic coverage and having negative evaluations to be less likely to vote for the 
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government than those either less exposed or more positive about the economy or both. 
Therefore, in order to be able to measure the conditioning effect of media coverage on the 
strength of economic voting, we dichotomize the media variable, distinguishing between 
readers of newspapers providing a larger share of economic coverage and readers of 
newspapers providing little. The cut-off points have been chosen to distinguish clusters of 
papers providing a lot of economic coverage from those providing little. In most cases these 
values are near the mean and median values for a survey wave.5 
 
Our second media variable is tone. This measure is only available for the 2002 and 2007 
waves, since in contrast to the two earlier studies, the media content analysis conducted in 
2011 that can be linked with INES does not include a measure of positive (+1), neutral (0) or 
negative (-1) content (McMenamin et al 2013, 2¶0DOOH\HWDO. 2014). Therefore, it is only for 
the two earlier elections that we can use this additional variable to test whether exposure to 
more positive or negative media judgments drives vote choice in addition to self-reported 
economic evaluations of respondents (H2). The measure of media tone we use is not a 
QHZVSDSHU¶VDVVHVVPHQWRIHFRQRPLFGHYHORSPHQWEXWUDWKHUDMXGJPHQWDERXWthe 
government¶V handling of the economy. All newspaper op-ed pieces and commentary were 
coded for tone whenever a reference was made to parties or political leaders. Selecting only 
those text segments that were also coded for containing coverage of economic issues, and 
then only those segments where judgments of the governing parties were given, we arrive at a 
measure of tone towards governing parties with regard to economic affairs. We take this as a 
meaningful indicator of media judgment of economic performance of the government as well 
as of economic policy proposals. Thus, the measure contains prospective as well retrospective 
media judgments on the economy and on the JRYHUQPHQW¶V competence in this respect. As 
with coverage, there is quite some variation across the different newspapers. In 2002, the 
Evening Herald was virtually neutral in its tone, while the other three newspapers for which 
we have data were quite critical of the government ± most so in the case of the Irish Times 
(see Table 2). By 2007, however, little is left of this criticism. On average, Irish newspapers 
ZHUHQRZQHXWUDOZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VHFRQRPLFcompetence, and the Irish Sun 
                                                          
5
 The cut-off point for 2002 is 15 percent economic coverage; those for the 2007 and 2011 elections are 9 and 
25, respectively. These cut-off points are at or very near the infection point separating two parts of a bimodal 
distribution. Applying different cut-off pints, such as the median, does not alter the substantive results reported 
below. 
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was strongly positive in its tone. During the 2007 election campaign, the only negative 
commentary reporting was produced by the Irish Times and the Irish Daily Star, and this was 
not nearly as negative as the average in 2002.  
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
The newspaper readership question in the survey allowed the recording of multiple responses, 
and many respondents indicated that they regularly used two or more different newspapers 
for political information.6 Therefore, when matching media content data to individual 
respondents, we average the coverage and tone measures for the different newspapers 
reported by a respondent. As readers of multiple newspapers did not indicate which papers 
they read more frequently and which less, we do not apply any weights when averaging. 
 
We include a number of standard control variables in our models. Above all, these include 
demographic information such as the sex (female=1, male=0), age, education, income, and 
whether a respondent lives in an urban or rural constituency. Education is a six-point original 
scale of the highest education level achieved by the time of the survey, ranging from no 
completed education (1) to university degree or equivalent (6). Income is measured by ten 
ordinal bands of respondents¶RYHUDOODQQXDOKRXVHKROGLQFRme before tax and including 
EHQHILWV%DQGVUDQJHIURPXQGHU¼WR¼DQGPRUHIn addition, we control for 
the self-placement of respondents on a left-right ideological dimension as well partisanship.7 
Summary statistics for all variables are reported in Appendix 1. 
 
Results 
To estimate the hypothesized effects of news coverage on economic voting (H1), we analyse 
data from the three election studies side by side (Table 3). As suggested by standard 
retrospective economic voting theory, at all three elections the probability that a respondent 
indicates a vote for the government increases with their evaluation of the economy. The 
                                                          
6
 5HVSRQGHQWVZHUHDVNHGWKHIROORZLQJTXHVWLRQµ:KLFKRIWKHIROORZLQJQHZVSDSHUVGR\RXUHJXODUO\XVHIRU
SROLWLFDOLQIRUPDWLRQ"¶7KLVZDVIROORZHGE\DOLVWRIDOOPDMRU,ULVKQHZVSDSHUVLQFOXGLQJ6XQGD\Sapers. 
7
 For left-ULJKWLGHRORJ\UHVSRQGHQWVZHUHDVNHGWKHIROORZLQJTXHVWLRQµ,QSROLWLFVSHRSOHVRPHWLPHVWDONRI
left and right. Where would you place yourself on a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means the left and 10 means the 
ULJKW"¶)RUSDUWLVDQVKLS WKHTXHVWLRQZDVµ'R\RXXVXDOO\WKLQNRI\RXUVHOIDVFORVHWRDQ\SROLWLFDOSDUW\"
>\HVQR@¶ 
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magnitude of the effect is considerable, with the odds of voting Fianna Fáil increasing by 
over 20 per cent in 2007 (Model III) and by almost 50 per cent in 2002 and 2011 (Models I 
and V) with every step toward a more positive evaluation on the five-point scale (models I 
through VI). However, we do not find any significant impact of the volume of newspaper 
reporting on economic matters. In particular, the interaction term of economic evaluations 
and coverage is not significant, which refutes Hypothesis 1 (models II, IV and VI). Of the 
control variables, only left-right ideology and partisanship have the expected association with 
vote choice. Respondents are more likely to report a vote for Fianna Fáil the more they tend 
toward the right of the ideological spectrum. The odds ratio is significantly different from 1 
in 2002 and 2007, but not in 2011. Similarly, respondents who think of themselves as close to 
a political party also show an increased likelihood to vote for the main government party 
(however, this association is not statistically significant in 2002). 
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
Next, we estimate logit models to assess the expectation that the likelihood of voting for the 
main government party is shaped by the tone of news reports on how the incumbent handles 
the economy (H2). The results are reported in Table 4. As with coverage, tone does not have 
any significant association with electoral support for the main incumbent party (models VII 
through X). To take account of the possibility that any effect on voting behaviour of the tone 
of newspaper reporting on the success of government economic policy depends on the 
volume with which such reports appear, we have also modelled an interaction term of tone 
and coverage (models VIII and X). This multiplicatory term also fails to display any 
significant association with voting behaviour.8 Thus, the estimates for reported in Table 4 
lead us to reject Hypothesis 2. Once again, with the exception of left-right ideology in 2002 
and partisanship in 2007, none of the control variable display a statistically significant 
association with vote choice. 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
A host of research from around the world KDVVKRZQWKDWYRWHUV¶SHUFHSWLRQVRIKRZ
                                                          
8
 Due to extreme multicollinearity, we have not estimated the interactive effect of tone and coverage in the 
context of the 2007 election. 
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governments handle the economy affect their decision at the ballot box (Lewis-Beck and 
Stegmaier 2007). More recent work has demonstrated that the media play an important role 
in shaping these perceptions (Hollanders and Vliegenthart 2011; Soroka et al. 2014). In the 
present chapter, we have investigated the extent to which the exposure to media reporting on 
the economy affect vote choice both quantitatively (how much the media report on the 
economy) and qualitatively (how WKHPHGLDSRUWUD\WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VHFRQRPLF
performance). We have analysed how media reporting interacts quantitatively with FLWL]HQV¶
HYDOXDWLRQVRIWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VHFRQRPLFSHUIRUPDQFHand qualitatively how the tone 
media reporting We have found that, once standard predictors of vote choice, above all 
economic evaluations, are taken into account, the media do not have any effect on the 
decision to vote for an incumbent party or at least not in the case of the three most recent 
Irish elections.  
 
Thus, standard economic voting theory applies to the Irish context, spanning the years of 
boom and bust alike. This contradicts the argument by Singer (2011) that in times of 
recession, voters may perceive the incumbent to be the victims of uncontrollable events and 
absolve them from responsibility. Our evidence shows that, while economic evaluations 
contribute to explaining pro- or anti-government vote choice in 2002 and again in 2011, 
they largely fail to do so on the brink of the national economic collapse in 2007. However, 
as in the context of the earlier and later elections, media reporting does not step in to fill the 
explanatory gap. Indeed, the average tone of economic reporting in Irish newspapers was 
much more benign concerning the role of the government in 2007 (-0.02) than in 2002, 
when a more critical tone (-0.48) accompanied an impressive economic boom.9 Overall, 
therefore, we conclude that the media do not reinforce the UROHRIYRWHUV¶economic 
perceptions for arriving at their vote choice. Neither do they directly influence this choice 
beyond the possible shaping of such perception. This is all the more remarkable as the 
causal link between economic evaluations and vote choice ± blaming the government ± is 
more directly captured in our measurement of news content than in the sociotropic 
perception of economic performance. Future research should investigate whether an indirect 
effect of the media exists that works via the shaping of voter perceptions of economic 
performance. 
                                                          
9
 The figures are averages of tone across all newspapers. The averages of tone by newspaper are very close (-
0.42 and 0.00, respectively, cf. also Table 2). 
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Table 1: Coverage of economic affairs in six Irish newspapers, 2002, 2007 and 2011 
 
 
2002 2007 2011 
Evening Herald 10.6 6.2 
 
Irish Examiner 11.7 9.5 20.7 
Irish Independent 16.4 8.7 26.8 
Irish Times 15.2 12.3 27.4 
Irish Sun 
 
3.8 30.8 
Irish Daily Star 
 
2.7 21.0 
Average 13.5 7.2 25.3 
 
Note: Cell entries are the percentage of total coverage devoted to economic issues over the 
course of the respective election campaign. 
 
 
Table 2: Tone of coverage of government handling of the economy in six Irish 
newspapers, 2002, 2007 and 2011 
 
 
2002 2007 
Evening Herald -0.06 0.00 
Irish Examiner -0.29 -0.01 
Irish Independent -0.55 0.01 
Irish Times -0.80 -0.27 
Irish Sun 
 
0.57 
Irish Daily Star 
 
-0.28 
Average -0.42 0.00 
 
Note: Cell entries are coded scores of the tone of MXGJPHQWDERXWWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VKDQGOLQJ
of the economy.  
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Table 3: Logit regression of economic voting and news coverage, 2002, 2007 and 2011 
 
 
2002 2007 2011 
 
I II III IV V VI 
Female 1.26 1.25 1.17 1.17 0.94 0.94 
 (0.332) (0.339) (0.415) (0.414) (0.779) (0.770) 
Age 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 
 (0.963) (0.900) (0.113) (0.211) (0.136) (0.143) 
Urban 0.97 0.96 0.92 0.95 0.68 0.68 
 (0.889) (0.879) (0.666) (0.789) (0.090) (0.089) 
Income  0.91 0.91 1.03 1.01 0.96 0.96 
 (0.511) (0.512) (0.772) (0.878) (0.432) (0.418) 
Education 0.85 0.86 0.94 0.91 0.99 0.98 
 (0.120) (0.131) (0.488) (0.256) (0.949) (0.890) 
Left-right ideology 1.11 1.11 1.07 1.08 1.09 1.09 
 (0.023) (0.021) (0.071) (0.046) (0.066) (0.067) 
Partisan 1.31 1.29 2.32 2.34 2.49 2.50 
 (0.274) (0.303) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Evaluation of economy 1.48 1.34 1.24 1.23 1.47 1.39 
 (0.017) (0.310) (0.036) (0.076) (0.009) (0.178) 
Economic news coverage 1.03  0.94  1.01            
 (0.556)  (0.139)  (0.777)            
High coverage  0.63  1.17  1.13 
  (0.762)  (0.871)  (0.798) 
Evaluation×High coverage  1.15  0.96  1.09 
  (0.683)  (0.848)  (0.790) 
Constant 0.06 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.03 0.04 
 (0.020) (0.119) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000) 
LL -219.91 -219.83 -324.68 -325.75 -263.69 -263.18 
Wald 18.70 18.86 41.16 39.02 39.14 40.17 
p>chi2 (0.028) (0.042) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
pseudoR2 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 
N 354 354 530 530 665 665 
 
Note: Cell entries are odds ratios; p-values in parentheses.  
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Table 4: Logit regression of economic voting and tone of news, 2002, 2007 and 2011 
 
 2002 2007 
 
VII VIII IX X 
Female 1.26 1.26 1.16 1.13 
 (0.333) (0.326) (0.454) (0.540) 
Age 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.01 
 (0.970) (0.995) (0.129) (0.172) 
Urban 0.97 0.99 0.92 1.01 
 (0.891) (0.967) (0.657) (0.950) 
Income  0.91 0.91 1.02 1.01 
 (0.498) (0.511) (0.848) (0.893) 
Education 0.85 0.85 0.94 0.93 
 (0.118) (0.126) (0.475) (0.429) 
Left-right ideology 1.11 1.11 1.07 1.07 
 (0.023) (0.026) (0.075) (0.079) 
Partisan 1.31 1.30 2.30 2.31 
 (0.275) (0.292) (0.000) (0.000) 
Evaluation of economy 1.48 1.48 1.23 1.20 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.043) (0.071) 
Economic news coverage 1.00  0.94            
 (0.989)  (0.165)            
Economic news tone 0.64 0.47 0.59 0.47 
 (0.813) (0.674) (0.316) (0.176) 
High coverage  2.15  1.27 
  (0.680)  (0.458) 
Tone×High coverage  4.41  - 
  (0.677)  - 
Constant 0.07 0.07 0.12 0.09 
 (0.112) (0.014) (0.006) (0.003) 
LL -219.88 -219.79 -324.17 -324.21 
Wald 18.76 18.93 42.19 42.10 
p>chi2 (0.043) (0.062) (0.00) (0.00) 
pseudoR2 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.06 
N 354 354 530 530 
 
Note: Cell entries are odds ratios; p-values in parentheses.  
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Appendix 1. Summary statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
2002 
     
Vote for incumbent 452 0.35 0.48 0 1 
Female 426 0.47 0.50 0 1 
Age 462 48.35 14.60 19 89 
Urban 452 0.42 0.49 0 1 
Income  416 2.80 1.00 1 4 
Education 464 3.90 1.34 1 6 
Left-right self-placement 419 6.63 2.56 0 11 
Partisan 464 0.32 0.47 0 1 
Evaluation of economy 462 4.26 0.89 1 5 
News coverage of economy 464 14.92 2.16 10.57 16.39 
High coverage 464 0.71 0.46 0 1 
Evaluation×Coverage 462 3.03 2.10 0 5 
Tone of econ. reporting 464 -0.48 0.17 -0.68 -0.06 
Tone×Coverage 464 -0.41 0.27 -0.68 0 
2007 
     
Vote for incumbent 690 0.36 0.48 0 1 
Female 714 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Age 767 50.69 15.50 18 94 
Urban 776 0.53 0.50 0 1 
Income  699 3.31 1.25 1 5 
Education 778 3.92 1.37 1 6 
Left-right self-placement 687 6.88 2.71 0 11 
Partisan 783 0.32 0.47 0 1 
Evaluation of economy 779 3.96 0.98 1 5 
News coverage of economy 783 7.64 2.59 2.72 10.90 
High coverage 783 0.27 0.44 0 1 
Evaluation×Coverage 779 1.07 1.83 0 5 
Tone of econ. reporting 783 -0.02 0.19 -0.28 0.57 
Tone×Coverage 783 -0.02 0.04 -0.14 0 
2011 
     
Vote for incumbent 996 0.15 0.35 0 1 
Female 996 0.46 0.50 0 1 
Age 996 45.30 15.86 18 90 
Urban 996 0.56 0.50 0 1 
Income  673 4.03 2.42 1 10 
Education 996 4.33 1.20 2 6 
Left-right self-placement  996 6.70 2.42 0 11 
Partisan 996 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Evaluation of economy 984 1.26 0.64 1 5 
News coverage of economy 996 25.42 3.34 20.68 30.76 
High coverage 996 0.64 0.48 0 1 
Evaluation×Coverage 984 0.82 0.81 0 5 
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